Source: The Australian
FAR from Afghanistan, Iraq and the flood plains of Pakistan, a bitter siege played out this week between al-Qa'ida and an American ally. Or did it?
The first reports from the siege of Lodar, in southern Yemen, told of 80,000 people fleeing as government forces encircled the town, dropping leaflets instructing residents to flee before a big offensive against al-Qa'ida militants hunkered there.
The next report revised the number of residents fleeing down to 3000, with 200 al-Qa'ida militants and 200 fighters from the secessionist Southern Movement holding the town. Yesterday the Yemeni government hailed its conquest of Lodar, having "stormed the dens of the terrorists". Its count of al-Qa'ida fighters killed came in at 12.
American intelligence officials briefed this week that al-Qa'ida's offshoot in Yemen had become the No 1 threat to the US homeland, greater even than that posed by the core group in Pakistan.
This assessment trailered the news that administration officials were now considering escalating operations in Yemen to include CIA drone attacks to supplement both the Yemeni military effort and the clandestine campaign of US military strikes and special forces operations already taking place there.
Intelligence officials have been warning for several years now of an increased threat from Yemen, where al-Qa'ida operatives were said to be moving from Pakistan because of the pressure of drone strikes there.
But Yemen soared to the top of the agenda with the failed Christmas Day bombing of a jetliner near Detroit by a young Nigerian man radicalised and trained in Yemen. His mentor was the American-born preacher Anwar al-Awlaki, who has helped to transform al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula from a local Yemeni outfit to a transnational terrorist threat.
Yet the situation in Yemen remains frustratingly opaque. One of the biggest problems for the US when it comes to Yemen is encapsulated in the story of the Lodar siege: few people appear to know what exactly is going on there or who al-Qa'ida really are -- an intelligence gap that carries huge risks for operations against them.
Yemen is a country of multiple insurgencies, some of which may have sought alliances with al-Qa'ida and some of which have definitely not, but all of whom the government would like to stamp out. Some Southern Movement groups go as far as to raise American flags at separatist rallies to prove their lack of allegiance to Osama bin Laden's followers. Those familiar with Yemen's complex security situation question the government's conflation of some rebel groups with al-Qa'ida, raising concerns about its motives in accepting foreign military aid.
American officials say that a CIA program in Yemen could help to improve patchy intelligence efforts there, casting light into currently murky corners such as Lodar, as they have done in Pakistan.
But Yemeni officials sound less keen. Under the current secret military collaboration, Yemen enjoys a modicum of control over operations, carrying out raids with the assistance and training of US special operations troops.
Military strikes are carried out with Yemeni assent by US cruise missiles but not, so far, either by military or CIA drones. If CIA drone strikes were brought into the equation, the US could potentially continue such operations, most likely from its base in Djibouti, even if Yemeni co-operation ended.
And those operations could be extended as far as Somalia, where Yemen-based al-Qa'ida militants are almost certain to drift if they feel the additional pressure from drone attacks.
Herein lies the problem with the drone program wherever it operates. Its efficacy on one front can open another. If the Pakistan program follows al-Qa'ida to Yemen, where, we might ask, will it end?
